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BANKRUPTCY POLICY IN A DEMATERIALISED 
INSOLVENCY LAW: GLIMPSES OF A HIDDEN 
SYSTEM 
Dr Joseph Spooner1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
It is a source of great pride that I have been asked to contribute to this special issue in memory of my 
mentor Professor Fletcher, and of sadness that he will not read this. In this essay I look at one of Professor 
Fletcher’s parting gifts, which appeared in the 2017 volume of this journal, in which he identified and 
challenged the ‘dematerialisation’ of insolvency law. In that work he drew attention to trends that have 
removed various key aspects of insolvency procedures ‘from open view’ and called into question the 
consequences of these developments.2 Professor Fletcher cautioned against the loss of transparency and 
public scrutiny due to increasingly invisible directors’ disqualification and bankruptcy restriction order 
proceedings, disappearing bankruptcy court hearings, and the discontinuation of physical creditors’ 
meetings. In this article I seek to add to Professor Fletcher’s case in arguing that two particularly important 
observations are obscured in a ‘dematerialised’ personal insolvency law.  
The first is that lawmakers appear to appreciate insufficiently the role that personal insolvency law can 
play in offering widespread debt relief in an economy and society suffering from the effects of excessive 
levels of household debt. While politicians apparently remain in denial regarding worryingly high 
household debt burdens, policy institutions from the Bank of England to the IMF warn of the risks 
involved in the persistent debt dependency of the contemporary economic order. A case for debt relief has 
emerged. This creates a central role for personal insolvency as a unique societal institution in its routine 
discharge of debt as of right. The second observation is the extent to which English personal insolvency 
law not only fails to fulfil this role but has lately retreated into an increasingly regressive system 
dominated by ideas of marketisation and the maximisation of returns to creditors and intermediaries. The 
history of personal insolvency policy is one of tension between the goals of debt collection and debtor 
rehabilitation.3 In particular, just as the policy case for prioritising debt relief seems strongest, the 
pendulum of English personal insolvency law practice has swung in the opposite direction towards 
maximising returns to creditors.  
Despite the centrality of household debt among causes of the Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession, 
personal insolvency law reform has not featured among policy responses. The prevailing opinion seems to 
be that English law operates effectively, as even those arguing for debt relief policies claim that ‘the UK 
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bankruptcy process is widely considered to offer an example of international best practice in terms of 
speedy discharge, flexibility and debtor recovery.’4 The reality of the law over the past decade, such as it 
remains open to public view, makes that perspective appear complacent. The ‘speedy’ debt discharge and 
debtor recovery under the bankruptcy and Debt Relief Order (DRO) procedures is increasingly denied to 
debtors. Further, the ‘flexibility’ of the law has become a euphemism for how its malleability allows 
creditors and intermediaries to advance their interests while producing outcomes that are less favourable 
for debtors and of dubious public interest. Government proposals for the introduction of a Statutory Debt 
Repayment Plan procedure would reintroduce a prior policy that has existed on the statute books - unused 
and without commencement - since the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Current policy 
betrays a lack of learning from the past decade regarding the urgency of household debt problems and the 
consequent public policy imperative of prioritising the debt relief function of personal insolvency law.   
 
2. THE CASE FOR DEBT RELIEF AND THE POTENTIAL OF 
PERSONAL INSOLVENCY LAW 
 
While the political chaos gripping the UK suggests that much has changed since the Global Financial 
Crisis, it may also indicate the reality that for most people the contemporary economic order has changed 
too little.5 After the crisis, the ‘Great Conversation that many were expecting never took place’.6  Our 
politics has not cast aside the trends of financialisation and dependence on debt that led our economy into 
turmoil. Austerity policies have intensified reliance on household debt to maintain both economic growth 
and household living standards, increasing the substitution of private debt for public debt.7 Pro-cyclical 
austerity has coincided with the worst decade for real wage growth in two centuries,8 leaving the economy 
heavily dependent on the ‘privatised Keynesian’ growth model of debt-based consumption.9 Evidencing a 
‘credit/welfare trade-off’,10 reduced social welfare provision is now linked to increased debt, with several 
reports blaming cuts for pushing households to borrow in order to fill new budget gaps.11  
This position leaves household indebtedness in the UK at historically high levels. Debt-to-income ratios of 
140% dwarf the equivalent level of less than 80% in 1987.12 Some estimates suggest that debt servicing 
ratios, representing the share of disposable household income spent on interest payments, now exceed pre-
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crisis figures.13 The Financial Conduct Authority has uncovered widespread default and persistent debt 
among credit card users (with over two million accounts falling into this latter category),14 while also 
finding concerns in bank overdraft and high-cost credit markets.15 In addition, there has been a notable 
rise of problem debt in relation to essential obligations such as rent arrears and debts owed to central 
and local government.16 The Money Advice Service now estimates that over eight million people in 
the UK can be categorised as over-indebted.17 
The weight of this household debt burden generates a powerful case for expansive debt relief policies. It 
also creates an important role for personal insolvency law as a unique institution for discharging debt. In 
2018, the National Audit Office (NAO) estimated the cost of problem debt at approximately £900 million 
per year. This cost captures individuals’ likelihood to be living in subsidised housing or to be experiencing 
anxiety or depression.18 Yet the figure represents only a small portion of the social costs of excessive 
household debt. For example, the NAO was unable to calculate costs relating to employment and social 
welfare benefits due to lack of data. A government estimate from 2003 cautiously proposed that reduced 
productivity resulting from over-indebtedness could amount to 30% of salary, approximately 1% of 
GDP.19 Current levels surely represent a cost we may not afford to bear in an economy plagued by low 
productivity. These figures also omit what the last decade has revealed as one of the crucial economic 
costs of high debt levels: lost consumer spending caused by household ‘debt overhang’.20 Mian and Sufi 
offer the most developed explanation of this effect. They illustrate how the Great Recession in the USA 
appears less related to a financial crisis of bank lending, and is more accurately attributable to falling 
consumption among highly indebted households.21 Similar effects of excessive leverage have been found 
in other countries, including the UK.22 Various technical accounts now recognise that debt-burdened 
households demonstrate a higher marginal propensity to consume than society’s creditors such that over-
indebtedness, or even heavy leverage among solvent households, may deny an economy its main 
spenders.23 In order to restore aggregate demand, policy responses in economic crises might require 
redistributing losses more evenly than the pro-creditor distributions produced by debt contracts,24 
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necessitating extensive household debt relief. As an example of the economic benefits of such 
redistribution, the FCA’s redress scheme in relation to PPI mis-selling has contributed to growth by 
refunding billions of pounds in compensation to borrowers.25 
One consequence of the current situation is that policymakers’ pre-crisis faith in the economic benefits of 
financial market expansion has been replaced by an emerging acceptance that ‘less finance can be 
better’.26  While once the link between financial development and growth was unquestioned, evidence 
mounts that elevated levels of leverage reduce the likelihood of economic growth. 27 Regulatory 
responses that restrict excessive lending are appropriate and can prevent future debt problems from 
building up.28 However, they cannot address existing high debt levels. Recent years have shown the limits 
of monetary policy both in addressing outstanding leverage levels and boosting household consumption 
activity.29 Fiscal measures are a more promising means of addressing debt overhang, with social transfers 
(such as unemployment benefits) acting as ‘automatic stabilisers’ to rebalance the economy.30 Nonetheless, 
that possibility has been so far thwarted by ideological commitments to austerity policies where 
governments see little available ‘fiscal space’ for such approaches.31 In this context, debt relief policy 
measures may be particularly appropriate as an alternative to fiscal measures in ‘economies with limited 
scope for expansionary macroeconomic policies’.32 I argue that a strong case exists for expansive debt 
relief policies and that personal insolvency law can offer this, particularly through debt discharge available 
under the bankruptcy and debt relief order (DRO) procedures. Yet bankruptcy laws are only rarely invoked 
in discussions regarding policy responses to problem of excessive household debt. Professor Fletcher 
argued that the ‘dematerialisation’ of insolvency has rendered the law less visible, with one consequence 
being the displacement of the law from the forefront of policymakers’ minds and public discussion. This 
dematerialisation also obscures the potentially central role that insolvency law could play in addressing 
this pressing policy challenge. In the next sections, I illustrate how a dematerialisation of personal 
insolvency, through declining use of public procedures and maximum privatisation, has increasingly 
driven the law out of the scope of democratic deliberation, while also inhibiting its ability to achieve 
positive public policy outcomes. 
 
3. AUSTERITY, RECESSION AND THE CHANGING SHAPE OF 
PERSONAL INSOLVENCY LAW  
 
The response of personal insolvency in the past decade has moved the law in the opposite direction to that 
suggested by the policy literature described above. In his 2017 article, Professor Fletcher wrote that ‘[s]ince the 
last quarter of the twentieth century successive reforms of the law of personal bankruptcy have been directed at 
providing a less harsh experience for those debtors deemed to belong to the category of “honest but unfortunate 
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casualties of circumstance”, rather than “irresponsible or amoral abusers of the credit system”.’33 This is 
undoubtedly true of law-on-the-books over this period, but law-in-action has done much to undo this legislative 
progress and to swing the pendulum away from debt relief and towards increased repayment to creditors. High 
costs and limited access criteria exclude debtors from the comparatively generous debt relief offered via the 
bankruptcy and DRO procedures. This has led to an alarming decline in use of these two procedures best placed 
to offer the debt relief contemporary economic conditions demand (Figure 1). Instead, these exclusions coupled 
with the marketing practices of insolvency intermediaries mean that most debtors are now subject to the harsher 
experiences of long-term repayment plans via Individual Voluntary Arrangements (IVAs) and Debt 
Management Plans (DMPs). This changes the shape of personal insolvency from a publicly-administered law 
under which debtors obtain relief as of right under democratically determined conditions, towards a privatised 
process under which the terms of debt forgiveness are set opaquely by creditors and intermediaries.  
 
FIGURE 3.1: PERSONAL INSOLVENCY RATES, 2005-2017. SOURCE: THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE 
 
 
A. CHALLENGING AUSTERITY AND THE MARKETISATION OF BANKRUPTCY  
One dimension of this trend, well-documented elsewhere,34 is the limited access to bankruptcy and DRO 
procedures caused by high fees (in relation to both procedures) and a ceiling on debt levels for DRO applicants 
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(currently set at £20,000).35 While access fees have long featured in bankruptcy law36 they were increased 
substantially (by 40%) between 2009 and 2011.37 This coincided with increasing court costs (alongside cuts to 
legal aid services38) under austerity policies.39 The effect of these fees in reducing access to employment 
tribunals generated considerable political controversy and criticism from observers,40 and ultimately led to a 
tipping point at which the judiciary invalidated these particular excesses of austerity. In UNISON, the UK 
Supreme Court condemned employment tribunal fees as contrary to the common law right of access to justice.41 
The legality of the bankruptcy fee regime relies on the turn-of-the-century decision by the Court of Appeal in 
Lightfoot.42 Here the court said that bankruptcy costs do not threaten access to justice and merely represent 
payment ‘towards the costs of services being provided by others for the petitioner’s benefit.’43 UNISON 
however challenges the ‘assumption that the administration of justice is merely a public service like any other 
[and] that courts and tribunals are providers of services to the “users” who appear before them’ as failing to 
understand ‘the importance of the rule of law’.44 The Supreme Court emphasised the public importance of 
access to the courts in developing the law through determining questions of public interest, and in giving effect 
to legislative rights where democratic politics has decided the public interest requires their enforcement, cannot 
be underestimated.45 According to the judges, in the employment law context it must be possible for employees 
to enforce rights, ‘if employment relationships are to be based on respect for those rights.’ The alternative is that 
‘the party in the stronger bargaining position will always prevail.’ Without access to justice, ‘laws are liable to 
become a dead letter, the work done by Parliament may be rendered nugatory, and the democratic election of 
Members of Parliament may become a meaningless charade.’46  
These words give considerable pause for thought as the number of bankruptcy cases plummets. Has austerity’s 
exclusion of debtors from bankruptcy undermined the democratic decision that insolvent debtors have the right 
to a ‘fresh start’ and full debt discharge on completing a one-year waiting period?47 The Lightfoot logic that 
bankruptcy does not involve issues of access to justice ignores how personal insolvency law develops in the 
courts as well as through statute and administrative practice,48 a fact that must be clear to the government 
agencies who litigate in superior courts in search of favourable interpretations of bankruptcy law.49 Access to 
justice arguments apply equally to the creditor-debtor relationship as to that of employers and employees. 
Personal insolvency laws form part of the ‘ground rules’ of credit markets, and the (un)availability of 
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bankruptcy to borrowers changes market dynamics considerably.50 Moreover, UNISON challenges the status 
quo of contemporary austerity and its underpinning neoliberal assumption that bankruptcy is merely a ‘service’ 
provided to paying ‘users’.51 It reminds us of the classic judicial observation that bankruptcy’s debt relief 
function must be recognised ‘as being of public, as well as private, interest, in that it gives to the honest but 
unfortunate debtor… a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure 
and discouragement of pre-existing debt.’52 The dematerialisation of insolvency law has been based on an 
overriding aim of ‘the elimination of resource-hungry procedures’,53 but bankruptcy may offer policy benefits 
for which it is worth paying. 
 
B. FAILURES IN THE PERSONAL INSOLVENCY MARKETPLACE  
 
The decline of the bankruptcy and DRO procedures has been accompanied by the rise of IVAs and DMPs, in 
what has effectively involved a privatisation of personal insolvency. This represents a lucrative development 
for intermediaries, particularly for large ‘volume’ providers,54 and evidence from the last decade raises 
substantial concerns regarding marketing practices underpinning these trends. The structure of English personal 
insolvency law has created a complicated array of potential solutions from which debtors must evaluate the most 
appropriate option, creating a privileged role for intermediaries as gatekeepers. This represents a classic agency 
problem, where the interests of intermediaries may diverge from those of the debtors they represent.55 
Evidence from a range of North American empirical studies demonstrates that insolvency intermediaries 
frequently ‘steer’ debtors into procedures based more on the advancement of intermediary interests than 
those of their clients.56 Unsurprisingly, regulatory investigations from the FCA and OFT have uncovered 
similar problems in the English system over the past decade.57  
In 2018, the Insolvency Service added to this picture in an investigation of the monitoring and regulation 
of Insolvency Practitioners (IPs), that raised ‘significant concerns about how IPs at “volume IVA” firms 
operate and are regulated.’58 It found ‘poor quality advice being given to debtors, potentially leading them 
to enter an IVA when other debt solutions may be more appropriate’, unjustified charging of expenses, and 
‘financial products being potentially mis-sold to individuals who do enter an IVA’.59 It also uncovered 
intermediaries manipulating figures regarding debtors’ expenditure so as to produce a monthly surplus 
income of £50 on debtor balance sheets, artificially pushing low-income debtors out of DRO eligibility and 
into IVAs.60 The Insolvency Service raised further concerns regarding the effectiveness of the self-
regulatory regime applicable to IPs, finding that the Recognised Professional Bodies overseeing 
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practitioners tended neither to bring disciplinary action nor to order compensation where evidence was 
available of debtors being diverted into inappropriate solutions.61 These findings should make clear the 
role of intermediary incentives in contributing to the trend towards increased IVAs and DMPs over 
bankruptcies and DROs.  
Supporting empirical evidence from the more carefully studied US bankruptcy system,62 the limited 
available evidence under a dematerialised English personal insolvency law suggests poor outcomes for 
many debtors who enter long-term repayment plans. Regulators have found creditors making onerous 
demands when negotiating IVAs,63 and have uncovered intermediary practices that involve squeezing 
debtors into unaffordable plans.64 In this context it is unsurprising that IVAs now exhibit failure rates of 
approximately 30-40%.65 The few published empirical studies of IVAs exhibit ‘general agreement that 
IVA terms are currently overly dictated by creditor groups’66 as ‘the debtor is effectively powerless’.67 
Over time creditors have leveraged this power to extend the average repayment period duration long 
beyond the three years envisaged by the Cork Committee on designing the IVA.68 Despite prevailing 
claims among stakeholders that IVAs typically endure for 5-6 years, Insolvency Service data show 
significant minorities of longer-term plans. By the end of 2017, ongoing IVAs included over five per cent 
of arrangements commenced in 2009 and almost one quarter of those commenced in 2011.69 Outcomes for 
debtors are even worse under DMPs, with the FCA finding many examples of debt management 
companies ‘recommending very long debt management plans (often many decades long, some 100+ years) 
when debt relief solutions are likely to have been more appropriate’.70 The FCA also uncovered problems 
of unsustainably high repayments under DMPs,71 alongside practices of intermediaries taking front-loaded 
fees before passing on any debtor payments to creditors, ‘rolling over’ debtors from unsustainable DMPs 
into IVAs, and discouraging debtors from availing of free debt advice.72 It is difficult to see how positive 
outcomes arise for debtors and the wider economy from financially struggled households remaining 
trapped in long-term repayment plans, often on the edge of affordability and failure. If regulators are 
concerned to address effects of ‘persistent debt’ among credit card borrowers,73 why should they be 
content to watch debtors increasingly becoming locked into persistent debt under IVAs and DMPs, when 
legislation makes rapid debt relief available under bankruptcy and DROs?  
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This evidence from the past decade should expose dubious claims that IVAs and/or DMPs can produce 
better outcomes for debtors than bankruptcy or DROs, outside of exceptional cases of debtors fortunate 
enough to benefit from significant property holdings or low debt levels (or, exceptionally, certain elevated 
professional status jeopardised by bankruptcy). Often such claims are founded on exaggerated accounts of 
the benefits of IVAs/DMPs and costs of bankruptcy/DROs. The 2018 Insolvency Service investigation 
found IPs leveraging public fears and lack of knowledge regarding bankruptcy in order to divert clients 
into more lucrative options.74 The lack of transparency associated with the dematerialisation of personal 
insolvency law has placed certain stakeholders into powerful positions as custodians of key information. In 
this context one might ask for self-reflection from professional organisations who list advantages of IVAs 
as including their ability to ‘allow an individual to avoid the perceived stigma of bankruptcy’. 75 It is 
difficult to see how these gatekeepers’ emphasis of negative associations does not itself contribute to 
bankruptcy stigma. 
The FCA’s response to its findings regarding DMPs was to conduct an extensive review of the debt 
management sector, refusing authorization to many providers.76 This action was effective in prompting 
many other providers to leave the marketplace voluntarily or switch to IVA provision, availing of the 
regulatory arbitrage opportunities made available by a system under which IVAs fall outside the FCA’s 
jurisdiction, and are subject to the lighter-touch regime exposed by the recent Insolvency Service 
investigation.77 The FCA’s judgment was that many DMP providers did not meet the minimum standards 
necessary to operate in the marketplace, and effectively that their DMPs were unsafe products.78 These 
DMP providers thus experienced a similar fate to high-cost lender Wonga, as firms whose business models 
were found to be unsustainable when subjected to regulatory scrutiny. This suggests that similar questions 
must be asked about the IVA firms found to have engaged in practices analogous to those of extinct DMP 
providers, and about the utility of the IVA product that in many cases guarantees worse outcomes for 
consumer debtors than bankruptcy or DROs.  
 
4. CURRENT GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS: PERSONAL 
INSOLVENCY LAW REMAINS OUT OF MIND 
 
A lack of transparency in the personal insolvency system may be convenient not only to the stakeholders 
operating profitably within this environment, but also to policymakers unwilling to confront its problems.79 
Changes to personal insolvency law since the crisis have been minimal. At time of writing, the government 
is consulting on the introduction of ‘Breathing Space’ and ‘Statutory Repayment Plan’ mechanisms.80  It is 
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puzzling to see these proposals prioritised, given the problems identified above and alternative reform 
ideas currently in circulation. In a recent report on household debt commissioned by the Money Advice 
Service, the first four of eight policy recommendations were directed at removing the obstacles to 
accessing bankruptcy outlined above.81 Meanwhile, Australian policymakers appear to have accepted 
evidence that their debt agreement procedure is susceptible to similar problems as the IVA market.82 They 
have introduced reforms to cap the length of repayment plans at three years, to empower the Australian 
Official Receiver to reject plans which risk causing financial hardship to debtors, and to tighten the 
regulation of practitioners.83 Irish personal insolvency law has determined reasonable levels of debtor 
repayments openly and democratically, in a manner that contrasts with the secrecy of the UK Standard 
Financial Statement model.84 In addition, debtor access fees have been waived and advice funding has 
been provided to debtors unable to hire intermediaries, while the underlying emphasis of the Insolvency 
Service of Ireland is to promote more, rather than fewer, personal insolvencies.85  
The UK government proposals are comparatively limited in their ambition. The ‘Breathing Space’ 
mechanism would allow debtors to apply, through a debt advice agency, for a moratorium on creditor 
collection activity while they receive advice regarding appropriate debt solutions. The proposed ‘Statutory 
Repayment Plan’ procedure effectively aims to put voluntary DMPs (involving full repayment of sums 
owed) on a statutory basis, making such arrangements legally binding when approved by a qualified 
majority of creditors (75% in value) and/or the Insolvency Service. The government consultation offers 
further evidence in support of Professor Ramsay’s observation that ‘historical amnesia is a common 
disease in bankruptcy policymaking’,86 as the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 has already 
enacted similar repayment plan provisions onto the statute book, though these have never been 
commenced. As minimalistic interventions, the proposals seem to emanate from a pre-crisis era of faith in 
the efficiency of financial markets and the welfare-enhancing nature of consumer credit. They conflict 
with the more drastic solutions warranted in the post-crisis era and the pressing contemporary case for 
expansive debt relief policies. They also appear to ignore the past decade of evidence regarding 
widespread problems associated with IVA and DMP repayment plans and the patently worse outcomes for 
debtors produced by these procedures compared to bankruptcy and DROs. It is difficult to explain why, at 
a time when the FCA is taking steps towards withdrawing DMPs from the marketplace, government 
wishes to give legislative imprimatur to this frequently defective product. Further, the addition of any new 
procedures (even those having potential to assist debtors, such as the ‘Breathing Space’) increases 
complexity and creates opportunities for intermediaries to avail of consumer confusion to divert those 
seeking assistance into most profitable options. 87  The proliferation of procedures contradicts 
recommendations advanced by the Cork Committee and several academic authors for the introduction of a 
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simple ‘single portal’ under which courts or administrators direct debtor applications to the most 
appropriate solutions from a public policy perspective.88 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights recently concluded that the UK 
government ‘has remained determinedly in a state of denial’ regarding the problem of poverty in this 
country.89 This state of denial seems to extend to problems of household debt. In responding to a recent 
Parliamentary committee enquiry on household finances, the government reported proudly that household 
incomes are slightly higher and debt levels slightly lower than before the crisis.90 One wonders how such 
limited improvement in household finances over the past decade could be celebrated, rather than 
recognised as an existential threat to our contemporary order of financialized capitalism. Household debt, 
and more narrowly personal insolvency, both fall between various government departments and bodies 
with none seemingly determined to take responsibility. 91  Government attitudes towards personal 
insolvency policy in recent decades have favoured maximum privatization and minimal public 
intervention, and observers might get the impression that policymakers are content for this area to remain 
out of sight and out of mind. This paper has aimed to show that such blindness comes at a high cost given 
personal insolvency law’s potential to address pressing policy challenges associated with excessive 
household debt and the current obstacles to the law fulfilling this potential. Professor Fletcher concluded 
his article by arguing that the time is right for a comprehensive empirical inquiry into the operation of 
insolvency law to produce a coherent restatement ‘fit for use in the twenty-first century’. 92 The very least 
we could do to honour Professor Fletcher would be to echo his call.  
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